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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
]. ROYAL ANDREASEN and 
ALTA N. ANDREASEN 
Plaintiffs and Respondents 
vs. 
GEORGE H. HANSEN and 
FLORENCE HANSEN 
Defendants and Appellants 
Case No. 8769 
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The Salt Lake Real Estate Board, which 1s not a 
party to the above entitled action but is vitally con-
cerned about those aspects hereinafter discussed of the 
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decision heretofore rendered by the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah in said action, herewith presents to the Su-
preme Court of the State of Utah its Amicus Curiae Brief 
in connection with a Motion for Rehearing of the De-
cision of the Supreme Court, duly made and entered in the 
above entitled action on the lOth day of February, 1959, 
and now reported in 3 3 5 P. 2d, page 404. 
The Salt Lake Real Estate Board, to the full extent 
of its authority, attempts to discipline its members and 
do all in its power to see that members of the Board, con-
stituting the majority of the real estate brokers and sales-
men in the Salt Lake City area, abide by the law and in all 
respects conform with the provisions of law, both statutory 
and . judicial. It is repectfully pointed out that the de-
cision rendered in the above entitled matter raises points 
which require clarification, in order that the Real Estate 
Board may discharge its responsibility and correctly advise 
its members as to their duties and responsibilities. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Point I 
THE USE OF TI-IE ((EARNEST MONEY RE-
CEIPT AND OFFER TO PURCHASE," THE FORM 
OF WHICH IS SEVERELY CRITICIZED BY THE 
COURT IN THE FEBRUARY 10, 1959, DECISION 
IN THE ABOVE ENTITLED CASE, IS MANDA-
TORY 
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Point 2. 
THE HOLDING OF THE COURT THAT THE 
RETENTION OF THE DOWN-PAYMENT CON-
STITUTED AN ELECTION TO ACCEPT THE 
DOWN-PAYMENT AS LIQUIDATED DAMAGES, IS 
CONTRARY TO LAW AND HARMFUL TO BOTH 
BUYERS AND SELLERS. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1 
THE USE OF THE ((EARNEST MONEY RE-
CEIPT AND OFFER TO PURCHASE", THE FORM 
OF WHICH IS SEVERELY CRITICIZED BY THE 
COURT IN THE FEBRUARY 10, 1959 DECISION 
IN THE ABOVE ENTITLED CASE, IS MANDA-
TORY. 
The Court, in its opinion in the above entitled matter, 
severely criticizes the .. Earnest Money Receipt and Offer 
to Purchase" which was used by the real estate broker in 
endeavoring to consummate a sale of the plaintiff's prop-
erty to defendants. The Court criticizes the size of the 
print and appears to infer that the form was prepared to 
discourage a customer from reading or understanding its 
and that portions of it are .. neatly buried in the center" so 
as to escape notice. It is respectfully pointed out that 
real estate salesmen are required by law to use this form. 
The 19 51 Legislature expanded the responsibilities of the 
State Securities Commission by enacting Chapter 102 of 
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the Laws of Utah 1951, which amended Title 82 of the 
Utah Code Annotated 1943. Sec. 82-2-20, as enacted by 
the 19 51 Legislature, provided: 
((It is expressly provided that a real estate 
salesman shall have the right to fill out and com-
plete an Earnest Money Receipt and Agreement 
in form to be approved by the Commission and 
forms provided by statute and that a real estate 
broker shall have the right to fill out and com-
plete forms of legal documents necessary to any 
real estate transaction to which the said broker 
is a party as principal or agent, and which forms 
have been approved by the Commission and the 
Attorney General of the State of Utah. Such 
forms shall include a closing real estate contract, 
a short-form lease, and a bill of sale of personal 
property." (Emphasis added) 
This same provision was carried over into the 19 53 
compilation of the code and now appears as Sec. 61-2-20 
Utah Code Annotated, 19 5 3. The 19 53 Code made no 
change whatever except to remove the capital letters from 
the words ((Earnest Money Receipt and Agreement," 
«Commission" and ((Attorney General". 
In 19 5 1, in order to discharge the responsibility placed 
upon the Securities Commission by the new law, Mr. M. H. 
Love, as Director of the Securities Commission, requested 
the suggestions of the Salt Lake Real Estate Board and a 
Committee of members of the Board was appointed to 
work with Mr. Love in preparing the prescribed ((Earnest 
Money Receipt and Agreement". This comn1ittee worked 
with the Securities Commission over an extended period 
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of time and finally developed a form of agreement which 
it was believed gave proper protection to both buyer 
and seller. This form was then presented to the Attorney 
General of the State of Utah for his approval as required 
by the law. The Attorney General retained the form 
iii ·his office for study for a month, and then on January 
8, 1952, wrote to the State Director of the Securities Com-
missi~n as follows: 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
SALT LAKE CITY 
January 8, 19 52 
M. H. Love, Director 
Sec uri ties Commission 
Department of Business Regulation 
Building 
Dear Mr. Love: 
51-194 
This will acknowledge receipt of your letter 
of December 7, 1951, requesting this office to ex-
amine a proposed .. earnest money receipt and 
offer to purchase" form and to advise you 
1. Whether rights of any person will be de-
nied thru its adoption, 
2. Whether the form is legal in every respect 
and in our opinion will protect the best 
interests of the contracting parties, and 
3. Whether this office approves the form 
which, under the statute, has been ap-
-- · proved by your Commission. 
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Section 82-2-20 as enacted by the 19 51 Legis-
lature, Chapter 102, Laws of Utah 1951, pro-
vides that your commission shall approve the form 
of the earnest money receipt and agreement. We 
are happy to give you our views concerning this 
form. 
The last paragraph of the agreement which 
reads 
The seller agrees in consideration of the 
efforts of the agent in procuring a purchaser, 
to pay said agent a commission of --% of 
the sale price. In the event seller has entered 
into a listing contract with any other agent 
and said contract is presently effective, this 
agreement will be of no force or effect. 
would seem to invalidate the entire agreement if 
there is a valid subsisting listing contract. We 
suggest that the word ((agreement" be changed to 
((paragraph", and that this paragraph be included 
in the second portion of the receipt rather than in 
its present position. 
With the exception of these two changes, we 
have no suggestions to make at this time concern-
ing the form. It appears to be legal and does not 
deny any substantive rights of persons signing the 
contract. 
GHT 
Yours very truly, 
(Signed) CLINTON D. VERNON 
Attorney General 
The Attorney General recommended two changes; 
1, the substitution of the word ((paragraph" for the word 
Hagreetnent"; and 2, the shifting of the paragraph into the 
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second portion of the receipt rather than in the first 
portion. These two changes were made and then the 
form was officially approved. In the minutes of a meet-
ing of the Utah Securities Commission held at 310 State 
Capitol, January 17, 1952, at 11:30 a.m., appears the 
following: 
((Director read the letter from the Attorney Gen-
eral Office #51-194 dated January 18, 1952, rela-
tive to proposed (earnest money receipt and offer 
to purchase.' The approved form was discussed 
and Director was instructed to send each real 
estate broker a copy, and to request the Salt Lake 
Real Estate Board to have such forms printed for 
the use of real estate brokers throughout the state." 
The form thus prescribed by the Securities Commis-
sion, approved by the Attorney General on January 8, 
1952, and approved by the Securities Commission on 
January 17, 19 52, is the identical form now in use by 
the Salt Lake Real Estate Board and is the identical form 
which was used by the Holt Realty Company in attempt-
ing to consummate a transaction between plaintiffs and 
defendants. 
The form of the agreement is not subject to change 
by the Salt Lake Real Estate Board nor by an individual 
salesman, and no opprobrium should be placed upon 
anyone for using the form. 
A word may be appropriate with reference to the 
size of the print. This is a practical matter. It is 
necessary that the earnest money receipt be made out in 
quadruplicate. If the print were any larger, then it 
would be necessary to use two pages. This would not 
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increase the likelihood of any purchaser reading the docu-
ment in full, but would rather discourage the reading, and 
the appearance of the document would be even more 
formidable. It is impossible to use larger print if the 
form is to be kept all on one page, because the blank lines 
now provided are scarcely adequate to contain the in-
formation which is customarily necessary in order to use 
the form. Down below the places for the signatures of 
the sellers and purchasers there is a blank space but this 
is quite essential in order to fill in special provisions, 
counter-offers and other matter that frequently must be 
filled in. 
It is respectfully submitted that the criticism of the 
form by the Supreme Court may encourage either dis-
gruntled sellers or disgruntled purchasers to attempt to 
avoid a valid contract which they may have entered into 
by claiming that the form or the size of the print pre-
vented them from having a full disclosure of their legal 
rights and responsibilities under the instrument executed 
by them. It is respectfully requested, therefore, that the 
Court reconsider and delete the criticism of the earnest 
money receipt and offer to purchase form which those 
who are required to use it are powerless to change. 
The facts hereinabove set forth, while not in the 
record of the appeal, are official acts of the executive de-
partments of the state, of which the court may take 
judicial notice as provided in Sec. 78-25-1 (3) UCA 1953. 
Point 2. 
THE HOLDING OF THE COURT THAT THE 
RETENTION OF THE DOWN PAYMENT CON-
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STITUTED AN ELECTION TO ACCEPT THE 
DOWN PAYMENT AS LIQUID A TED DAMAGES IS 
CONTRARY TO LAW AND HARMFUL TO BOTH 
BUYERS and SELLERS. 
The holding of the Court that the retention of the 
down payment constituted an election to accept the 
down payment as liquidated damages was not based upon 
any argument or authorities contained either in Ap-
pellants' Brief nor in Respondents' Brief. As a matter of 
fact, this exact point was not discussed in either Brief. 
Appellant's Brief cites a number of cases to the effect 
that the seller had two remedies; one, to accept the 
liquidated damages; and the other, to require specific 
performance. As a matter of fact, the seller has three 
remedies; the acceptance of the liquidated damages; the 
requirement of specific performance; or third, the rejec-
tion of the liquidated damages with the right to recover 
actual damages in excess thereof. None of the cases cited 
by defendant deal with the question as to whether or not 
the retention of the down payment constituted an election. 
The problem before the court is not a question of whether 
or not the court may award damages in excess of the 
.. liquidated damages" but whether or not the plaintiff, 
while verbally refusing to exercise the option to accept 
the earnest money as liquidated damages, unwittingly 
exercised the option by the retention of the money by 
his agent. 
The law on this subject is set forth in 92 CJS, p. 312, 
as follows: 
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uA vender who notifies the purchaser that 
he will hold the deposit and apply it to his 
damages, does not elect to enforce a forfeiture or 
lose his right to sue for damages." 
This statement by the editors of CJS cites as authori-
ty, a California case, Royer v. Carter, 224 P. 2d 767. This 
case is squarely in point and seems to have been well con-
sidered and appears to be a just and correct statement of 
the law. 
In the California case, which the editors of CJS ap-
prove, the purchaser entered into an agreement to buy 
property at an agreed price of $24,000.00. A deposit of 
$1,000.00 was paid as earnest money. The contract 
provided, uthat should the purchaser fail to pay the bal-
ance of the purchase price or fail to complete the pur-
chase as herein provided, the amounts paid hereon may, at 
the option of the seller, be retained as a consideration for 
the execution of this agreement by the seller." In that 
case too, the plaintiff retained the deposit, not in satisfac-
tion of the claim for damages, but to apply in part satis-
faction. The Court held uPlaintiff did not, as contended 
by defendant, exercise her option to forfeit the deposit. 
Upon defendant's notification that she did not intend to 
comply with the contract, plaintiff notified her that she, 
plaintiff, elected to hold defendant in damages and that 
the $1,000.00 deposit did not cover the damages already 
accrued. Since defendant had repudiated her contract, 
plaintiff was entitled to retain the deposit and to apply it 
on the damages suffered by her." Royer v. Carter, Supra, 
Defendant contended that she understood and be-
lieved when she signed the agreement that all she could lose 
was the amount of the deposit, and the real estate agent 
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testified that he expressed «his opinion" that such would 
be the limit of her loss. Notwithstanding her belief and 
the «opinion" of the agent the California Supreme Court 
held that «plaintiff was entitled to retain the deposit and 
to apply it on the damages." A motion for re-hearing was 
filed and the Court reconsidered this rna tter, and in a late~ 
opinion which appears at 23 3 P. 2d, 5 39, the doctrine 
which had been so briefly set forth, was further considered 
and the opinion pertaining to the point under discussion 
was strengthened. The retention of the earnest money de-
posit, defendant contended, constituted an election. The 
Supreme Court held that such was not the case and that 
the retention of the deposit was not inconsistent with the 
right to hold defendant responsible for damages. The 
Court said: 
.. The contract provided (That should the purchaser 
fail to pay the balance of the purchase price, or 
fail to complete the purchase, as herein provided, 
the amountss paid hereon may, at the option of the 
seller, be retained as the consideration for the exe-
cution of this agreement by the seller.' Defendant 
contends that under this provision plaintiff had an 
option to retain the down payment instead of suing 
for damages and that she exercised this option by 
retaining the deposit. The retention of the deposit 
was not, however, inconsistent with plaintiff's 
right to elect to hold defendant responsibie for 
damages. Independently of any right she may 
have had under the option clause itself, see Civil 
Code, Sec. 1670, 1671; Freedman v. Rector War-
dens, etc., Cal. Sup., 230 P. 2d 629, plaintiff had 
the alternative right to retain the down payment as 
a set off against her actual damages. Baffa v. John-
son, 3 5 Cal. 2d 3 6, 40, 216 P. 2d 13. Her retention 
- ---------~~---------
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of the money was . consistent with the choice of 
either remedy. Since she informed defendant of 
her intention to hold defendant liable for actual 
damages, if the latter did no.t perform the con-
tract, and since her conduct was not incon-sistent 
with the election of that remedy, the trial court 
·was justified in finding that the udeposit was re-
tained by her to apply on damages sustained by 
reason of defendant's breach of contract." 
It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the 
California Court is a well considered and correct state-
ment of the law. To constitute an election of a legal 
remedy, three factors are necessary. The rule is set 
forth in 28 CJS 1077 as follows: 
.. To constitute an election of remedies at least 
three things are essential: 
( 1) There must be in fact two or more coexisting 
remedies between which the party has the right to 
elect. ( 2) The remedies thus open to him must be 
inconsistent. ( 3) He must, by actually bringing 
his action or by some other decisive act, with 
knowledge of the facts, indicate his choice between 
these inconsistent remedies.'" 28 CJS 1077. This 
statement is quoted. with approval in Cook v. 
Covey Ballard Motor Company, 25 3 P. 196, 199; 
69 Ut. 161. 
In the case now before the Court there were, of 
course, two or more coexisting remedies between which 
the party had the right to elect, but it is respectfully 
submitted that the remedies, to-wit: the right to dam-
ages, and the right to retain the down payment as part 
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of and to apply on the damages, are not inconsistent. 
What constitutes consistency or inconsistency? In dis-
cussing the doctrine of what is consistent and what is 
not consistent, CJS sets forth the rule, 
uTo make them inconsistent one action must al-
lege what the other denies, or the allegation in one 
must necessarily repudiate or be repugnant to the 
other. It is the inconsistency of the demands 
which make the election of one remedial right 
an estoppel against the assertion of the other and 
not the fact that the forms of action are different. 
Another test sometimes applied is: can the facts 
necessary to support one remedy coincide with the 
facts necessary to support the other?" 28 CJS 1068. 
Applying these tests to the case now before the 
Court, it is apparent that no inconsistency exists. In 
this case facts exist which give to the plaintiff a right to 
damages against the defendant, and the same facts support 
either the right to the ((liquidated damages" or the right 
to assert and prove additional damages if the one having 
the right to elect decides not to accept the liquidated 
damages. There is no inconsistency whatever. It would 
be inconsistent if the seller elected to sue for the payments 
accrued, thereby affirming that the contract is still in 
force, and at the same time, sue for damages upon the 
ground that the contract had been terminated. In such 
event there would be an inconsistency and assertion of the 
one would be an election and a rejection of the other, but 
where the only question at issue is the amount of the 
damages, there is no inconsistency. The seller has the 
right to ((retain the deposit and apply it on the damages 
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suffered." Royer v. Carter, supra. There is nothing 
inconsistent about such a course of procedure. 
Had the plaintiff said nothing but merely retained 
the deposit, there might have been then an inference of 
acceptance and election; but where, as here, both the 
District Court and the Supreme Court found that he 
unequivocally stated that he was not exercising his option 
to forfeit the deposit, then the mere retention of the 
deposit does not constitute a contrary election. This 
matter was considered by the California Court in still a 
later case, Gattuccio v. Kallam, 314 P. 2d 178, 31 ALR 
2d 8, in which the Court found, 
.. Under the trial court's findings the actual dam-
ages were over $18,000. and appellant cannot com-
plain that respondents elected to take and the 
trial court awarded them only the $10,000. de-
posits SINCE THEY MIGHT HAVE RETAIN-
ED THE DEPOSIT AS AN OFFSET AND 
RECOVERED THE BALANCE OF THE DAM-
AGES." authorities cited (caps added). 
Lest the Court should feel that the California Courts 
are relying upon a special statute contrary to the common 
law, we deem it proper at this point to quote the applic-
able provisions from the California Code and which we 
respectfully submit are in no way contrary to the com-
mon law bearing on this subject. The Royer v. Carter 
case supra, refers to Sections 1670 and 1671 of the Cali-
fornia Civil Code. These sections read as follows: 
Sec. 1670: «Every contract by which the amount 
of damage to be paid, or other compensation to be 
made, for a breach of ~1n obligation, is detern1ined 
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in anticipation thereof, is to that extent void, ex-
cept as expressly provided in the next section." 
Sec. 1671: ttThe parties to a contract may agree 
therein upon an amount which shall be presumed 
to be the amount of damage sustained by a breach 
thereof, when, from the nature of the case, it 
would be impracticable or extremely difficult to 
fix the actual damage." 
It is respectfully submitted that this does not amend 
the common law and that therefore, the Code provisions 
in no way affect the strength of the statements of the 
California Supreme Court in their application to the case 
now before the court. 
For the Supreme Court to hold that the retention of 
a down payment, in the face of a statement that the 
seller was not exercising his option to forfeit the down 
payment, nevertheless constituted an election to forfeit the 
down payment, can give rise to many vexatious problems. 
In the Uniform Sales Act, for example, Section 60-4-2 
(c) UCA 1953 one of the rights given to an unpaid seller 
is to resell the merchandise. Would the holding of the 
Court in the case now before us, as originally decided in 
3 3 5 P. 2d 404, require the refund or tender back of the 
down payment before a seller would have the right to 
resell the merchandise? In the case of the repossession 
and re-sale of an automobile, would this ruling require a 
return of the down payment before the automobile could 
be sold and the buyer held for damages for deficiency? 
Suppose a real estate broker, because of his own interest 
in the earnest money deposit, for commission earned when 
a buy and sell agreement is executed, declines, upon re-
quest of the seller, to refund the earnest money, would 
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such a refusal constitute an election by the seller, con-
trary to his ex pressed decision not to exercise his option 
to accept the sum which the buyer tenders as liquidated 
damages. These are but a few of the vexatious ques-
tions that will be raised by the courts decision. 
Certainly the provision in the earnest money receipt 
approved by the State Securities Commission, giving to 
the seller the option to retain the down payment as liqui-
dated damages, is acumlative remedy, and for the sell-
er to seek for damages and off-set against those damages 
the amount of the earnest money deposit, as expressly 
authorized by the cases above quoted is not an incon-
sistent action and does not, therefore, consitute an elec-
ton. Where the remedies are not inconsistent, the person 
entitled to the remedies may pursue any or all of them 
until he has received full satisfaction of his claim. 
uwhen remedies are not inconsistent and are mere-
ly cumulative, the party may pursue either or both 
without violating any rule of law or procedure." 
Robison v. Robison, 59 Ut. 215, 226. 
What is the effect of the provision contained in the 
earnest money receipt? 
In effect the buyer says If I do not go through with 
this transaction I am willing to forfeit to you, as liquidated 
damages on my part the sum paid as a down payment. 
The seller does not agree that he will accept that sum. 
Because of intervening circumstances it might be wholly 
inadequate. He does not agree to waive his right to a 
determination of dan1ages for breach. His is the option 
to accept the sum proffered by the buyer as liquidated 
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damages, or to reject it and seek any other remedy avail-
able to him at law. These other remedies include the right 
to specific performance and the right to assert and prove 
actual damages for breach. 
Now if there were no option granted to seller, or if 
there were a provision by which the seller agreed that as 
to him the amount of down payment should constitute 
liquidated damages, then the rule would be different, and 
the cases quoted by defendant would apply, but this is 
not the case. This is a provision which is binding 
only upon the buyer until an election is made by the seller. 
Now what will be the practical result if the decision 
of the court in this respect is permitted to stand? It will 
tend to stifle real estate sales. It may work great hard-
ship on many prospective buyers. Often a buyer will 
have only a nominal down payment. To raise a substan-
tial down payment when his offer may not be accepted 
might work a distinct hardship and may entail needless 
sacrifice and expense. But, if the court's ruling stands, then 
transactions based on a nominal down payment will cease 
to exist. No seller would consider accepting an offer 
without a down payment of sufficient size to adequately 
compensate for damages sustained if the buyer later fails 
to raise the balance of the money. Would not the ends of 
justice to both buyer and seller be better served to permit 
transactions to be made, based on a nominal consideration 
the seller relying for his security upon the rule of law set 
forth in CJS, supra, givipg to the seller the right to dam-
ages, against which the down payment may be applied. 
By the rule as set forth in CJS the buyer has adequate 
protection. He is not compelled to sacrifice assets to 
raise a large down payment when his offer may not even 
be accepted. A nominal down payment will suffice. Then 
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if there is a breach and the seller claims damages and holds 
the down payment to apply on the claimed damages, if the 
court holds for buyer that there is no liability by buyer the 
court can then order the return of the down payment to 
buyer, rendering judgment therefor against the seller; 
while if judgment is for the seller the down payment 
will apply as part satisfaction thereof. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the previous opinion 
of the Supreme Court should be modified: 
(a) To delete therefrom all criticism of the earnest 
money receipt, use of which by members of the real estate 
profession is compulsory, until the form is changed by 
the State Securitiess Commission; and 
(b) To reverse the holding that the retention of the 
earnest money deposit constitutes, notwithstanding the 
assertions of the seller to the contrary, an election by the 
seller to accept such sum as liquidated damages, and in 
lieu thereof to hold that the statement in 92 CJS 312 
HA vendor who satisfies the purchaser that he will 
hold the deposit and apply it to his damages does 
not elect to enforce a forfeiture or lose his right to 
damages." 
correct! y states the Ia w. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JENSEN & JENSEN 
By Perris S. Jensen 
t\ltorn{'ys /or Salt Lake Real 
Estate Board 
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